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SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 
 
Irene Calboli and Daniel Gervais1 
 
Geographical indications and their close cousins, appellations of origin, have 
taken center-stage in international intellectual property, in particular since the 
conclusion of the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement.2  
Let us begin by briefly defining these terms. Appellations of origin are 
denominations that designate a locality, which may be as small as a village or as 
big as a country, in order to distinguish products produced in that locality and 
produced either according to regulations or “local, constant and trusted usage”3 
in such locality which results in certain quality or characteristics of the product 
and/or its fame. Typically, the special fame, quality or characteristic of the 
product will be due to a method of production combined with the extraction and 
use of local natural resources.  The notion is not, however, confined to food 
products. Industrial products may also be protected by an appellation due to the 
availability of specialized skills, raw materials and/or know-how.4  Protection                                                              
1 Irene Calboli is Visiting Professor and the Deputy Director of the Applied Research 
Centre for Intellectual Assets and the Law in Asia (ARCIALA) at Singapore Management 
University School of Law and Professor of Law at Texas A&M University School of Law. 
Daniel Gervais is Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University and President-elect of the 
Association of International Association for the Advancement of  Teaching and Research 
in Intellectual Property (ATRIP). This paper is based on a number of previous 
publications by the coauthors. All hyperlinks to URLs contained in footnotes were last 
checked on September 30, 2015. 
2 Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and Geographical 
Indications and Regulations under the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on 
Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications, WIPO document LI/DC/19 of 
May 20, 2015, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=15625 
[hereinafter the “Geneva Act”].  The earlier version was the Lisbon Agreement for 
the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International Registration, Oct. 31, 
1958, as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 923 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Lisbon 
Agreement].  
3 Actes De La Conférence Réunie À Lisbonne Du 6 Au 31 Octobre  1958 (Geneva, BIRPI, 
1963), at 813.  The Acts of the Lisbon Conference were published in French. All 
translations are the authors’ own. 
4 See ibid.  For example, Hungary has a protected appellations for fencing blades on the 
Lisbon register (Szentgotthárd—Lisbon appellation No. 586).  
may also extend to a certain presentation of products for sale.  The 1958 Actes 
note that an appellation of origin is usually linked to the special qualities of a 
product associated with a “terroir,” while indications of source can be used in 
association with any kind of product.5 In normative terms at least, this notion of 
terroir undergirds the Lisbon system. 
By contrast, the TRIPS Agreement and the Geneva Act use the notion of 
“geographical indications (GI).” 6  Like appellations of origin, the focus of GIs is 
on quality or characteristics of goods that derive from geographical origin. TRIPS 
added semiotic flexibility by encompassing any indication (name or otherwise) 
that would point to a particular geographic origin as long as a certain quality or 
characteristic (and/or reputation) is attributable to that origin. Indeed, the 
practice under the Lisbon Agreement has been to register denominations that 
may not be “names” stricto sensu. The 2015 Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement 
uses both notions (appellations of origins and GIs) and thus can be said to blend 
the 1958 and TRIPS notions. 
 In this short paper, we suggest first a theoretical framework to understand 
the sources of the socio-economic functions of the GIs. We then apply the 
framework and explore how GIs can be used to maintain and increase diversity in 
the marketplace. In the third and last part we consider the costs and benefits of 
protecting GIs. 
 
I. Theoretical Aspects 
 
Terroir is a multifaceted notion. It is a vector for cultural, historical but 
also very real economic narratives.   
Economically, attaching an intangible, yet measurable (most notably in 
terms of higher prices) value to the geographic origin of a product seems to 
postulate the existence of a correlative, measurable difference in quality, an 
observable difference between products of different origin but similar                                                              
5 This notion of “terroir” is discussed below.  
6  TRIPS Agreement, Art. 22.1 
composition (say, a wine produced from Pinot Noir grapes in Napa Valley or 
Bourgogne (Burgundy)).  One may make the case that such differences are 
multifactorial and hard to quantify. Indeed, it is convenient to say that the human 
and natural factors at play are inseparable, but that is not entirely true.  A 
number of French wine producers are producing wines in the New World, and 
the knowhow and equipment/technique used in both localitys are fairly similar.7 
One may then posit that the remaining differences lie in natural factors, such as 
soil and climate. 
Culturally, as legal flag-bearer for terroir geographical indications 
implicate a certain emotional resonance, especially in Europe. For French wine 
and food producers, the terroir runs deep: it is not an exaggeration to say it is 
linked to a search for their national identity. The combination of all three 
produces a unique product, related to the French concept of terroir.    
Historically, this link between a product and the terroir can be traced back to the 
fifteenth century in Europe and is best epitomized by the system of Appellations 
d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC) in France.8  The AOC system established “by the Law 
of the 30th of July of 1935 has created a specific type of French wine: AOC 
wines.9 These wines use the notion of terroir to distinguish themselves from the 
other wines.  A terroir relies on natural and human factors and their 
specificities.”10  
These historical, cultural and economic threads are woven together in the 
operation of the marketplace for goods protected by GIs. French AOC wines 
command a higher price because they incorporate what economists would refer 
to as a monopoly rent--as essentially any product protected by an intellectual                                                              
7 “MUMM” is an example of a French producer from the Champagne region now also 
producing bubbly wine using something resembliong méthode champenoise but in 
California.  See www.mummnapa.com.  
8 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle, aet.721-1 (France). 
9 See Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, And Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About 
Geographical Indications, (2006) 58 Hastings L.J. 299, 307-308. 
10 David Menival, The Greatest French AOCs: A Signal of Quality for the Best Wines 1 
(2007). Working paper available at http://academyofwinebusiness.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/04/Menival-The-efficiency-of-french-AOCs-as-signal-of-
quality.pdf.  
property right. If the higher price is validated by the market, it is because the 
consumer gets something in return. Under the AOC system and a number of 
similar systems administered by the Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité 
(INAO), a number of products (wines, spirits, but also cheese, candy, etc.) can be 
identified as having been produced in a certain region not only if the geographic 
provenance is factually correct but if certain codified guidelines for the 
production were followed.11 A system based on a high level of protection for 
denominations of origin emphasizes the second cluster of factors and uses it as a 
marketing tool to extract additional rent.  Very concretely, the consumer is asked 
to pay more (or less) because a white wine made with Sauvignon grapes will not 
be the same even if made by the same person using the same technique in 
Loudoun county in Ontario (Canada), the Loire valley of France or the 
Marlborough region of New Zealand. 12  The acidity of the soil, the amount of rain 
and sun exposure will affect the outcome. Climate variations from year-to-year 
but also climate change trends also lead to significant differences in wine 
produced in any given region--a geographic origin is not guarantee of stable 
climate conditions.13   
A number of theoretical tools may be useful in efforts to circumscribe and 
understand the debates about the value of GIs.  For example, the theory of 
Conventions14 can be used to explain how GIs and its associated socio-economic 
value(s) emerge in a given locality. At its simplest level, a Convention is “a                                                              
11 See http://www.inao.gouv.fr/.  
12 Among the soil-related factors that are most important are the drainage capacity, 
salinity, and the ability of the soil to retain heat thus encouraging ripening and the 
development of stronger roots. See David Bird Understanding Wine Technology: The 
Science of Wine Explained, 3rd edn. (San Francisco, Board and Bench Publishing, 2011). 
13 How climate change will affect certain GIs is beyond the scope of this short paper but 
is certainly a matter worthy of further and ongoing studies. 
14 See Andrea Marescotti, “Marketing channels, quality hallmarks and the theory of 
conventions,” in Bertil Sylvander, Dominique Barjolle, and Filippo Arfini, eds, The Socio-
Economics of Origin Labelled Products in Agri-Food Supply Chains: Spatial, 
Institutional and Co-ordination aspects. Proceedings of 67th European Association of 
Agricultural Economists (EAAE) Seminar, INRA, Série Actes et Communications, n.17 
vol.2, (Paris, 2000), pp.103-122. available at http://www.origin-
food.org/pdf/partners/marmarke.pdf.  
coordination mechanism that emerges to collectively resolve a situation that 
could not be done exclusively through an individual decision.”15  While the theory 
is often associated with game theory (e.g., socialization prior to or as part of the 
bargaining process), a French offshoot of the theory focuses on process and 
specifically how “coordination between firms – and more generally between the 
actors within a given system – can be based on decision making mechanisms,” 
and social interaction mechanisms between economic operators. 16We use the 
latter version here because the notion that a geographical origin is directly linked 
to a particular quality of a product is particularly strong in that country. 
The “quality” of a particular product (such as wine) is neither a pure 
market-based phenomenon nor a completely fuzzy and subjective notion.  
Instead, it should be viewed as the result of an “endogenous social construction 
that contributes to coordinating the actors’ activities, to the same extent as other 
conventions. Quality emerges from a process of negotiation among actors, with 
reference to common principles which are able to ‘justify’ their actions, such as 
the market price, respecting specific standards, adherence to moral and ethical 
principles.”17  This explains why a GI, the name (or other identifier) of a locality 
in which people learn a specific know-how over time, transmit it, protect it and 
use it to produce goods bearing that name often grows deep cultural and socio-
economic roots.  Products produced in that locality are perceived by their 
producer to have a special quality. From a conventions theory standpoint, quality 
is not as much a result as a process (a “qualification convention”) with strong 
social and identity functions and feedback loops. This qualification convention, 
“rather than defining the quality of the exchanged good, refers to the rules of the 
game and the role of the actor within the exchange.”18  Producers who know how 
and can (legally and technically) produce the GI product are members of a club, 
guardians of a process.                                                               
15 Ibid. at 104. 
16 Ibid. at 105. 
17 Ibid. See also François Eymard-Duvernay, « La négociation de la qualité, » [1993] 
Economie rurale, n° 217. 
18 Ibid.  
It is then the function of the market to communicate this quality to those 
who do not live I or near that locality. GIs products “embed” the special quality.  
To use Polanyi’s well-known words, “the economy is not embedded in social 
relations, social relations are embedded in the economy.”19  Naturally, the 
consumer in the United States who does not share the history and culture of the 
French, Italian or Spanish terroir may not easily identify with the “conventions” 
that were used to define the “quality” of the product at its point of origin. Yet that 
same consumer can learn through various mechanisms including advertising of 
course why she should attribute a higher value to a product, what one might refer 
to as a perception of a higher “quality. This approach is not dissimilar from the 
approach of letting an industry define its own quality standards and convincing 
consumers that the standard matters.  For GI products, that function may have 
“non-economic” components—though such components do affect economic 
outcomes.    As the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) reminds 
us, quality is not (limited to) testing a product against a strict technical standard 
in a mass production context. It is, and this may especially true for products 
made by artisans, the “totality of features and characteristics of a product or 
service that bears its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs.”20 Those” needs” 
may be reflected in the exotic nature of the product or the perceived qualities 
associated with its origin, in the same way that consumers make purchasing 
decisions based on perceived quality of a brand.  The needs are thus 
fundamentally perceptions based on experience or information received from 
peers or marketing.21   Quality control, in this context, is not designed for risk 
reduction (making sure, say, that there is no E.coli bacteria in cheese) but rather 
the transmission to the product of the combination of knowhow and natural 
                                                             
19 Ibid., at xxiv 
20 From the Online Business Dictionary. See 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/quality.html. 
21 Marketing theory teaches that “perceived quality depends on consumers’ global 
evaluation according to the available information.” Oude Ophuis P., H. Van Trijp, 
“Perceived quality: a market driven and consumer oriented approach,” (1995) 6 Food 
Quality and Preference 177. 
factors that infuse it with that je-ne-sais-quoi that creates the higher value in the 
mind of the consumer.   
 In some cases no measurable objective quality exists between that product 
and its non-GI equivalent. Yet as Professor McCarthy noted, trademarks also 
perform an “irrational” yet well accepted function in guiding consumer behavior: 
An economist who draws up a set of criteria for market analysis finds that 
conclusions flow from the criteria set up. If price, quality, and rationality 
are the only criteria of an economic system, then emotional consumer 
choices do not fit into this economic model. Advertising investment in 
promoting such choices are then regarded as wasteful and non-productive. 
The problem is that human beings, not economists' symbols, purchase 
products. Moreover, as noted earlier, modern economic analysis teaches 
that brand loyalty is not irrational consumer behavior.[FN2] It is a 
common sense, rational method of reducing shopping or "search" costs. 
Additionally, who can agree on a definition of "irrationality" when it comes 
to buying goods? Where is this buyer who only buys goods on the basis of 
price and quality alone, eschewing all feelings and emotional impulses? He 
or she sounds like quite a dull person.22 
 
In the world of terroir-based products, this has given rise to the 
phenomenon of “cognitive marketing.”23  One could argue of course that all 
marketing is “cognitive” of course to the extent it involves a cognitive process. 
Fair enough. Marketing does aim to provide information (if the term is loosely 
defined) to change consumer’s preferences.24  The marketing of geographical 
origins via GIs, however, is arguably “more cognitive” than traditional marketing 
because it must engage the consumer by educating her about the somewhat 
intangible value that she should find in the product with a given geographical 
origin. Put differently and more concretely, the consumer must believe that that 
Brie will be not just different but better because it was produced in Meaux 
(France) and not in Wisconsin.  
                                                              
22 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 4th ed., vol. 
1, § 2:38 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 2014) 
23 See Bernard Lassaut and Bertil Sylvander, “Producer-consumer relationships in typical 
products supply chains : where are the theoretical differences with standard products ?, “ 
in [1997] Proceedings of the 52nd EAAE Seminar 239. 
24 See ibid. at 244. 
This discussion has focused mostly on European goods. Several developing 
countries believe that they could capture additional rents due to the perception of 
higher quality associated with certain geographical origins if their GIs were 
protected in major foreign markets.25  For some products, this ties into--or may 
be confused with--“fair trade” labels and certification processes concerning the 
sourcing of an increasingly wide range of products, many of which come from the 
developing world (coffee, tea, cocoa, etc.).26 For example, among the (relatively 
few) appellations on the Lisbon register for products other than wines and spirits, 
one finds crafts and coffee from Mexico, one of the few developing nations to 
have made more than token use of the Lisbon system.27 Not (yet) a Lisbon 
member, India has indicated a willingness to develop and protect several 
indications, including for tea and rice.28  
                                                             
25 See Sarah Bowen, Development from Within? The Potential for Geographical 
Indications in the Global South, 2 (2009) DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-1796.2009.00361.x., at 2. 
26 For a discussion of fair trade labeling initiatives, see 
http://www.fairtrade.net/labelling_initiatives.html.  
27 See Lisbon-protected appellations such as Talavera (No. 833) for “handcraft objects” 
and Ambar de Chiapas (No. 842) registered for “semi-precious stones of vegetal origin, 
for its use in derivative products, namely, jewelry, art objects and religious objects”.  In 
2007, the European Union granted GI protection to its first non-European indication, 
namely “Café de Colombia.”  
Other examples of denominations of interest for products other wines and spirits (only a 
few of which are currently protected under the Lisbon system) include: “Parmigiano-
Reggiano” for cheese, (Italy), “Basmati” for rice (India and Pakistan), “Malbuner” for 
meat products (Liechtenstein), “Ulmo” for honey (Chile), “Curuba” fruit (Colombia), 
“Phu Quoc” for fish sauce (Vietnam), “Antigua” (Guatemala) or “Mocha” (Yemen) for 
coffee, “Chuao” for cacao (Venezuela), “Ceylon” (Sri Lanka) or “Long Jin” (China) for tea, 
“Champagne” for sparkling wine (France), “Bordeaux” for wines (France), “Havana” for 
tobacco (Cuba), “Bukhara” (Uzbekistan) or “Hereke” (Turkey) for carpets, “Talavera” 
(Mexico) or “Arita” (Japan) for ceramics, “Limoges” for porcelain (France), “Malaysia” 
for palm oil, “Kalamkari” for textiles (India); “Geneva” for watches (Switzerland) or 
“Bobo” for masks (Burkina Faso). See Felix Addor and Alexandra Grazioli, “Geographical 
Indications beyond Wines and Spirits: A Roadmap for a Better Protection for 
Geographical Indications in the WTO/ TRIPS Agreement,” (2002) 5:6 J. World Int. 
Prop. 865. 
28 See Kasturi Das, “International Protection of India's Geographical Indications with 
Special Reference to ‘Darjeeling’ Tea,” (2006) 9:5 J. World Int. Prop. 459 and S. K. 
Soam, Analysis of Prospective Geographical Indications of India, (2004) 8:5 J. World 
Int. Prop. 679, at 684. 
GIs have broader implications still. Recent research suggests that GI 
protection may impact future global food consumption patterns and lead to shifts 
in current agricultural models.29  As such, GIs may have deep environmental 
significance and they may be form an increasingly relevant part of agricultural 
and food policy. 30  Not surprisingly, the debate has captured the imagination of a 
number of consumer groups, many of which insist on proper labeling of products 
to clarify their origin, partly, it seems, in order to buy more locally produced 
products and reduce the carbon footprint of their consumption patterns, but also 
on the “quality assurance factor”31 associated with specific GIs.32 This is true also 
in the United States, where consumers are increasingly differentiating among 
various points of origin even within U.S. borders.33  GI use is progressing rapidly 
despite claims that GIs lead to higher prices for no “real” higher value.34  
There are several theoretical critiques of GIs that should be mentioned 
here. A major theoretical critique against protecting GIs (as intellectual property 
rights) is that GIs do not incentivize innovation or development in the same way 
other intellectual property rights do. In particular, GI opponents argue that GI 
protection rewards product conformity within a particular region rather than 
promoting individual creativity or innovation.35 This makes GIs fit awkwardly 
within theories of intellectual property protection based on incentives.  Indeed 
GIs are perhaps more about preservation, protection and transmission of                                                              
29 See Elizabeth Barham, “Translating Terroir: The Global Challenge of French AOC 
Labelling,” (2003) 19 J. of Rural Studies 127, at 127-128. 
30 See William van Caenegem, “Registered GIs: Intellectual Property, Agricultural Policy 
and International Trade,” (2004), 26 European Int. Prop. Rev. 170, at 171.    
31 See Alberto Francisco Ribeiro de Almeida, “Key Differences between Trade Marks and 
Geographical Indications,” (2008), 30 European Int. Prop. Rev. 406. 
32 See David Goodman, “Rural Europe Redux? Reflections on Alternative Agro-Food 
Networks and Paradigm Change,” Sociologia Ruralis, 44(1), 3, 5 (2004).  
33 See Daniele Giovannucci, Elizabeth Barham and Richard Pirog, Defining and 
Marketing ‘‘Local’’ Foods: Geographical Indications for US Products, (2010) 13:2 J. 
World Int. Prop. 94. 
34 The reality of the notion of “higher quality” in this context is discussed below.  
35 See e.g. Kal Raustiala and Stephen R. Munzer, “The Global Struggle Over Geographic 
Indications,” (2007), 18 Eur. J. Int’l L. 337 at 359–60; Hughes, note 9 above, at 368–73. 
“traditional” knowledge. GI opponents also suggest that GIs protection fits 
awkwardly within property theories, as GIs are collective rights that are rooted in 
a certain locality, and cannot be owned nor commercialized as other rights can 
be, which also includes the fact that they cannot be assigned or licensed.36  Again 
this makes GIs a more communal form of intellectual property, another parallel 
between GIs and traditional knowledge.37  
If not for innovation in the usual sense, GIs offer important incentives to 
promote local and rural development. In particular, GIs facilitate the 
establishment of GI-denominated (niche) markets by motivating groups of 
regional producers to meet particular production standards with respect to 
certain types of products. When these producers have established their products 
in the market, GIs incentivize the same groups to continue to invest in the quality 
of the GI-denominated products, and thus facilitates maintaining the social 
capital for the entire group that operates within the GI-denominated region.38 
GIs allow GI producers to capture the value (rent) that consumers—at the local, 
national, or international level—place on these GI-denominated products based 
on the product’s geographical origin.  In other words, GIs capitalize on people’s 
desire to choose products with a known geographical identity—ham from Parma, 
silk from Thailand, tea from Darjeeling, coffee from Colombia, and so on.   We 
will now take a deeper look at this aspect. 
 
II. Economic Benefits of Geographical Indications of Origin for 
Local Development and Consumers 
                                                              
36 See Dev Gangjee, “Quibbling Siblings: Conflicts Between Trademarks and Geographic 
Indications”, (2007).82 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1253, at 1256–59. 
37 See Daniel Gervais, “Traditional Innovation and the Ongoing Debate on the Protection 
of Geographical Indications,” in Intellectual Property and Indigenous Innovation (Peter 
Drahos And Susy Frankel, Eds) (Australia National University Press, 2012), available at 
http://press.anu.edu.au//apps/bookworm/view/Indigenous+Peoples’+Innovation:+Int
ellectual+Property+Pathways+to+Development/9731/ch06.html#toc_marker-11.  
38  See Dev Gangjee, “Relocating Geographical Indications,” Cambridge Intellectual 
Property and Information Law Series, (2012) at 266, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1863350 . 
To capture the value associated with the products bearing their GI, 
producers rely on the fact that consumers associate the GI-denominated products 
with the respective GI-denominated locality.39 Accordingly, GI producers need 
legal protection against confusing uses of terms identical or similar to their GIs. 
They argue that they need protection against free-riders who would use the GIs 
outside their accurate geographical context, even when consumers are not 
confused, as these “not-geographically-accurate” uses could lead to the loss of 
distinctiveness of the GIs.  Free riders are not part of and do not contribute to 
sustaining the GI-denominated markets. 40 They could make subpar products 
with little concern over the impact that lower product standards could have, in 
the long term, on the perceived market reputation of the GI-denominated 
markets.41   
GIs typically aim to provide consumers with information about the quality 
and characteristics of the products.  Ultimately this may empower consumers to 
make better-informed purchasing decisions. Admittedly, sometimes this is very 
superficial, but the same can be said of advertising generally and trademarks in 
particular.  That said, GIs are a little different. By informing the consumer about 
the origin of the natural substance and the practices that go into making the 
products, GIs can offer important information about origin, safety and “quality” 
of GI-denominated products.42 For example, the use of a given GI can indicate a 
certain method of production, which in turn indicates the level that a product is 
tied to the land, or the level of “naturalness” of a product. This set of information 
can assist consumers in identifying potentially healthier foods for their individual                                                              
39  Michelle Agdomar, “Removing the Greek From Feta and Adding Korbel to 
Champagne: The Paradox of Geographical Indications in International Law,” (2008), 18 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 541, at 578-580 For a different perspective, see 
Rosemary J. Coombe et al., “Geographical Indications: The Promise, Perils and Politics 
of Protecting Place-Based Products”, in Matthew David & Deborah Halbert eds, The 
Sage Handbook of Intellectual Property 207 (London, Sage, 2014). 
40 Margaret Ritzert, “Champagne is from Champagne: An Economic Justification for 
Extending Trademark-Level Protection to Wine-Related Geographical Indicators,” 
(2009) 37 AIPLA Q.J. 191, 212–20. 
41 See Agdomar, note  39, at 586-587. 
42 Ibid. at 587-588. 
needs, or artifacts made with traditional or environmental-friendly 
manufacturing techniques for those countries that provide GI protection beyond 
food-related products.  Along the same lines, GIs can also play an important role 
in providing information about the impact of the manufacturing and other 
practices used to produce the GI-denominated products on the environment, 
public health, and even labor practices, with a possible human rights 
connection.43   
  Ultimately, by acting as identification links between GI-
denominated regions and GI-denominated products and offering consumers a 
pool of information from which to select from when selecting products in the 
market, GIs can contribute to reward those producers who adopt environmental, 
health, and labor-related friendly policies. Since GIs force producers to remain in 
a particular locality and use the local land and the local human factor to produce 
the GI-denominated products, the long term heath of the land and its resources is 
crucial for the long term success of the producers operating in the GI-
denominated region. Thus, producers are motivated to adopt environmentally 
sustainable production methods and maintain the physical heath of the region—
the land, water, and air. Likewise, GIs can create “geographical accountability” 
and can assist in holding accountable those producers who do not maintain the 
“well-being” of the land, but instead cause damage. Ultimately, by tying 
producers to the land, GIs assist in placing the “cost” of such damage primarily 
on the shoulders of the producers’ group.44 Moreover, GIs may assist in reducing 
possible “contagion effects” due to negative incidents in a given geographical 
market, while consumers may continue to purchase the same type of products 
originating elsewhere. 45  
Accordingly, appropriate protection for GIs is necessary in order to protect 
producers’ ability to offer correct information to consumers. In contrast, a lack of 
protection for GIs could lead to the erosion of the ability of GIs to signal the                                                              
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid. at 588. 
45 For example, consumers could avoid contaminated cured meat or cheese from a given 
area. 
geographical origin from which the GI-denominated products originate. In turn, 
this would deprive consumers of important sources of information about the 
qualities that are associated with geographical origin and manufacturing process 
of the GI-denominated products.46  Ultimately, it could also lead to the death of 
the GIs by genericide, at it has been argued by the EU and other countries that 
have a vested interested in their national GIs, and it has been proven by the fact 
that several geographical names (many of them originating from Europe) are 
today considered to be common terms in foreign countries, especially in “New 
World” countries. Famous examples in this respect as terms such as Asiago, 
Parmesan, Gouda, and Feta.47  
 
III. Benefits and Costs of Protecting Geographical Indications  
Like most and perhaps all intellectual property rights, GI protection also 
comes with significant inherent costs. These costs have to be carefully scrutinized 
as part of a well-informed debate on GIs. In particular, like other forms of 
intellectual property rights, granting exclusive rights in GIs can (or does) create 
barriers to entry in the market for the group-level products for competitors--for 
example, the broader market for sparkling wine, and the special niche reserved 
for Champagne-denominated products.48  
The benefits of GI protection must be carefully considered against these 
costs, primarily the effect of GI protection on competition and other public 
interest-related issues such as freedom of expression in commercial and non-
commercial settings.  GI policy that protects GIs from unfair competition and 
misappropriation is sound, but this policy musty also offer specific limitations to 
guarantee the functioning of a competitive marketplace.                                                                
46 See Marco Ricolfi, “Geographical Symbols in Intellectual Property Law”, in Reto M. 
Hilty, Josef Drexl & Wilhelm Nordemann eds, Schutz Von Kreativität Und Wettbewerb: 
Festschrift für Ulrich Loewenheim zum 75. Geburtstag 239 (Munich, Beck, 2009). 
47 See Dwijen Rangnekar, & S. Kumar, “Another Look at Basmati: Genericity and the 
Problems of a Transborder Geographical Indication,” (2010) 13(2) J.  Intell. Prop. 202; 
see also Dev Gangjee, “Say Cheese: A Sharper Image of Generic Use through the Lens of 
Feta,” (2007) 5 European Int. Prop. Rev. 172. 
48 Raustiala & Munzer,  note 35 at 359–60; and Hughes, note  9, at 368–73.  
The quintessential condition to follow in order to achieve a balanced system 
of GI protection is that the right to use a GI should be granted only to those 
producers whose products effectively originate ideally in their entirety from the 
GI-denominated territory either because the products are grown in that area—for 
the agricultural products—or because the products are manufactured therein—for 
products that need to be processed with local human factor. In the latter case, the 
granting of GI protection should be strictly reserved to those producers that 
manufacture the products in their entirety in the region, and possibly with 
ingredients and raw materials also exclusively from the region. In the event that 
some of the ingredients or raw materials do not originate from the region, the 
percentages of these variations should be clearly defined as part of the process for 
obtaining GI protection and the actual origin, and the amounts, of those 
ingredients and raw materials should be fully disclosed in the product packaging. 
It is only when the GI-denominated products entirely originate from the GI-
denominated regions that GIs can perform their functions as incentive for local 
development and vehicles of accurate information regarding the origin, quality, 
and characteristics of the products. Only under these circumstances can GI 
protection fully motivate GI producers to invest in, and maintain the health and 
wealth of the GI-denominated regions. Additionally, GI producers can also be 
held accountable for the conservation and even in some cases the overall well-
being of the locality. A strict enforcement of the territorial linkage between the 
GI-denominated products and the regions is also liable to provide a stronger 
normative basis to protect GIs because the communities in the locality, and, in 
turn, the countries in which it is located, which are more likely to benefit when 
that linkage is present.49   
When this linkage between product and origin is loosened, however, GI 
opponents’ argument that GIs are a disguised subsidy for local producers against 
competitors from outside the region takes on a different and more convincing 
hue. Correlatively, the basis for protecting GIs—as signs that identify the actual 
geographical origin of the products—becomes weaker.  Without a strong                                                              
49 See Jeremy N. Sheff, “Marks, Morals, and Markets,” (2013), 65 Stanford L. Rev. 761. 
territorial linkage, the use of GIs may give consumers misleading information 
about the actual origin and characteristics of the products. 
This said, when GI protection is based upon or linked to a strict 
enforcement of the underlying terroir requirement, the argument that GI 
protection “stifles competition,” 50  which is repeated by GI opponents, is no 
longer a sound argument. Notably, granting a group of producers in a certain 
region the exclusive right to identify their products as coming from that region—
for example Chianti, Bordeaux, or Napa valley wines—does not affect competition 
within the type-level products that GIs identify—the market for wines. To the 
contrary, any competitor from another region remains entitled to produce the 
same kind of products—red, white, or other type of wine—and sell it in the local, 
national, and international market. In other words, granting exclusive rights in 
GIs to local producers simply prevents competitors from using “the same 
nomenclature”51 to identify their products and does not prevent competitors from 
producing the same type of products under their own trade name, or even under 
the name of their own locality.52   
GI protection could actually result in increasing competition and 
innovation in the market. In particular, the recognition of GIs can force outside 
producers “to develop innovative techniques to improve upon a product to 
compete vis-a-vis the [GI-denominated] product category.”53 As Massimo Vittori, 
along similar lines, “GIs present limited risks of reducing competition in the 
marketplace, and rather have the potential to promote competitive behaviours among 
producers keen to differentiate their offer of goods through improved quality. 
                                                             
50 Agdomar,  note 39, at 590. 
51 Ibid. at 591. 
52 See Doris Estelle Long, “Branding the Land: Creating Global Meanings for Local 
Characteristics,” in Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds, Trademark Protection and 
Territoriality Challenges in a Global Economy 100 (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2014). 
53 Ibid. 
Consumers also benefit from GIs as they reduce transaction costs in their search for 
‘’niche products’’.”54   
For example, it has been argued that it was after Australia ceded to EU 
pressure and ceased to use several terms protected as GIs in the EU (deemed to 
be generic in Australia) that the wine industry in Australia truly grew globally 
because Australian producers started to invest in local names, which became 
symbols of excellent wines worldwide. Likewise, the U.S., a country notoriously 
anti-GI protection, has long enforced strong protection for appellation of wines 
due to the relevant business interests of California and other wine making 
regions. 55  Here again, wines from California are among the most successful 
business stories in the U.S. and these wines are known worldwide for their 
excellent quality and characteristics.  Finally, protecting GIs does not interfere 
with the competition that naturally exists between producers that operate in the 
same GI-denominated region.  For example, there are several (separately owned) 
“Champagne” wine-makers in the Champagne region of France, and several 
(separately owned) “Chianti” wine-makers in the Chianti region of Italy. These 
winemakers share the interest of maintaining the reputation of the region 
worldwide, but they also compete with each other for the sales of their individual 
products. 
Still, even though GI protection does not stifle competition in the market 
for the general type products, not all unauthorized uses of GIs should be 
forbidden. Indeed, a major issue with GIs and their introduction in New World 
markets is the recognition that producers of generic producers must be protected.                                                              
54 Massimo Vittori, “The International Debate on Geographical Indications (GIs): The 
Point of View of the Global Coalition of GI Producers,” (2010)  13:2 J. World Int. Prop. 
304.__ 
55  The U.S. protects GIs identifying wines as appellations of origin for wine. This 
protection applies both at the federal and state level. At the federal level, it is the 
Treasury Department’s Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) (until 2003 
the same function was performed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) that 
grants applicants the permission to indicate that a certain wine, which meets specific 
requirements, originates from a particular geographical area in the U.S. See 27 C.F.R. 
4.25, 4.25a; 27 U.S.C.A. § 201, § 205. See McCarthy, note 22, vol. 2 §14:19.50. See also 
Michael Maher, “In Vino Veritas? Clarifying the Use of Geographic References on 
American Wine Labels,” (2001), 89 California L. Rev. 1881  
Those producers believe that they have acquired the right to continue to sell their 
product using what foreign producers consider a GI but that these generic 
producers consider a term descriptive of a product type rather than a symbol 
representing a locality. A balanced GI policy should not foreclose the use of GIs 
by outside competitors with respect to the unauthorized use of GIs for describing 
and comparing their products with GI-denominated products. These uses may 
not be desired by GI producers, yet scholars in the U.S. have correctly pointed out 
that banning these uses would run against the test established by the US 
Supreme Court in the Central Hudson case,56 which protects non-misleading 
commercial speech.57  Likewise, it could be argued that preventing these uses in 
the EU could give rise to a challenge under the principle of freedom of expression 
embodied in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.58 
Accordingly, a balanced system of GI protection should make allowances 
for generic producers in markets in which GIs protection is introduced. This can 
take many forms. Transitional periods come to mind of course. They were 
considered the method of choice when TRIPS was introduced and higher 
intellectual protection (including GIs) was “pushed” on many developing nations.  
Yet transitional periods are unlikely to be sufficient to quell opposition to GIs in 
many New World markets. 
 Another option is to allow the unauthorized uses of GI-related terms 
accompanied by the terms “style,” “like,” or “type,” provided these terms are not 
used to engender consumer confusion and mislead consumers as to the origin of 
competitors’ products. 59   This solution is compatible with TRIPS with the 
exception of the provision in Article 23 of TRIPS that directly excludes the use of                                                              
56 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
57 Harry N. Niska, “The European Union Trips Over the U.S. Constitution: Can the First 
Amendment Save the Bologna That Has a First Name?,” (2004) 13 Minn. J. Global 
Trade 413, at 440-441.  
58 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 
10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.  
59 Irene Calboli, “Expanding the Protection of Geographical Indications of Origin Under 
TRIPs: “Old” Debate or “New” Opportunity?”, (2006) 10 Marquette Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 
181, 192-202. 
“style,” “like,” or “type” with respect to GIs identifying wines and spirits.60 It is, 
however, unlikely to be found compliant with the Lisbon Agreement (whether the 
1958 version of the Geneva Act). Indeed, this option would be strongly opposed 
by GI beneficiaries, in particular in the EU, which is negotiating for a GI 
protection that prohibits these uses as part of FTA negotiations with other 
countries. Yet, this option does resolve the competition and linguistic-related 
concerns that have been raised, with valid reasons, with respect to GI protection. 
Ultimately, the adoption of such a compromising approach could offer an even 
stronger argument in support of additional GI protection, and could contribute to 
more countries effectively embracing GI protection on a larger basis compared to 
today.  
Options to move forward are not binary, in the sense that it does not mean 
that either the GI or generic producers must win all. The US-EU wine Pact 
created a category of semi-generic appellations for example.61 It is worth noting 
that almost all wine-related appellations currently on the Lisbon register are protected in 
the United States under either Article 7(1) or 7(4) of this Pact.62  Article 7(4) basically 
recalls that a number of European wine appellations were already protected under US                                                              
60 TRIPS Agreement, art. 23. Comparison between GI-denominated products and non-
GI-denominated products is also excluded under the system of comparative advertising 
that has been adopted in the EU with the Comparative Advertising Directive. See, 
Council Directive 97/55, art. 3a(1), 1997 O.J. (L 290) 18, 21 (EC) (“Comparative 
advertising shall, as far as the comparison is concerned, be permitted when . . . for 
products with designation of origin [the comparison] relates in each case to products 
with the same designation.”). 
61 March 10, 2006. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=2
541 [“Wine Pact”].  See also Agreement In The Form Of An Exchange Of Letters 
Between The United States Of America And The European Community On Matters 
Related To Trade In Wine, Document EUUSA/CE/en1 and en2, Nov. 23, 2005, available 
at http://www.ttb.gov/wine/wineagreement.pdf?cm_sp=ExternalLink-_-Federal-_-
Treasury. 
62 There is arguably no new effective protection in the Wine Pact compared to the 
previous US situation. Under 27CFR4.24(c) and 27CFR12.31, which protect names of 
geographic significance, which have not been found by the Administrator of the Alcohol 
and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (Department of the Treasury) to be generic or semi-
generic.  Examples include  Bordeaux Blanc, Bordeaux, Rouge, Graves, Médoc, Saint-
Julien, Château Yquem, Château Margaux, Château Lafite, Pommard, Chambertin, 
Montrachet and Rhône 
regulations prior to the Wine Pact. Then Article 7(1) adds a list of additional appellations 
that “may be used as names of origin for wine only to designate wines of the origin 
indicated by such a name.”  They are described as “names of quality wines produced in 
specified regions and names of table wines with geographical indications [...] and names 
of Member States [of the European Union].” 63 There are only a few instances where an 
appellation protected under the Wine Pact seems to clash with a live trademark owned by 
a third party. 64   More importantly, the Pact allows continued use of semi-generic 
appellations used in the United States before December 13, 2005, provided the term is 
only used on labels bearing the brand name for which an applicable certificate of label 
approval (COLA) has been issued.65   
While the Wine Pact mentions that it does not “affect the rights and obligations of 
the Parties under the WTO Agreement,” which includes the TRIPS Agreement, it would 
be politically and perhaps legally difficult for the European Communities to complain 
that the U.S violates TRIPS by implementing the Wine Pact the Europeans signed.66 It is 
likely that the recent conclusion of the Geneva Act may be seen as an opportunity to get 
back some of the concession made in the Wine Pact, however.  
 
Conclusion 
GIs encapsulate cultural and historical values. They allow producers to 
translate those values in economic terms and port them to export markets, 
capturing additional rents that both recognize their role as custodians of                                                              
63 Some of which were partially protected as sub-appellations under existing US 
regulations. For example, “Anjou” was protected under the regulations mentioned in the 
previous note, but Article 7(1) will also protect more specific sub-appellations such as 
“Anjou Val de Loire.”   
64 Examples include “Chéverny” and “Charlemagne.” 
65 COLAs are issued by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, under 
24CFR4.30.  See http://www.ttb.gov/forms/f510031.pdf. According to Annex 2 of the 
Wine Pact, the full list of such denominations, which signal both a geographical origin 
and a type of product, is as follows: Burgundy (though not the French “Bourgogne”), 
Chablis, Champagne, Chianti, Claret, Haut Sauterne, Hock, Madeira, Malaga, Marsala, 
Moselle, Port, Retsina, Rhine, Sauterne, Sherry and Tokay.  Provisions implementing 
Article 6 were introduced in December 2006 by s. 422 of the appropriately named Tax 
Relief and Health Care Act of 2006.    
66 Wine Pact, Article 12(1). 
traditions in the making of specific goods, and hopefully to preserve their locality, 
know-how and greater diversity in the global marketplace for wines, spirits, 
agricultural products, crafts and other GI-denominated products.  GIs bring 
value to informed consumers but they increase certain costs, their introduction in 
markets in which generic producers exist must be carefully considered. 
 
